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O n t He C over of t Ue R o IUnq S tone:
T owarcI a ThEORy of C uI tura L ThERApy
K aLi T aL

On the cover of the 7 April 1988 Rolling Stone there is a picture
of Martin Luther King. He's looking toward the future and his head fills
the page, even covering a portion of the Rolling Stone logo — and the
issue carries the headline ‘ Portrait of a G eneration.'
‘ An
unprecedented poll of young Americans: What they think about their
lives, their county and their leaders.' ’ Rolling Stone paints a picture of
a generation whose idealism springs from the example of the civil rights
movement, and whose disillusion is bom partly of the assassinations of
its cherished heroes — Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy — but
"m ore profoundly the bitter disillusionment resuiting from the war in
Vietnam '2. According to the Rolling Stone survey, the lessons this
generation learned from Vietnam were "totally negative'3. The result
of the Vietnam experience is that a generation consumed by the idea
that it could rebuild the nation in its own idealistic image has given up
this dream and retreated back into itself. No longer Interested in the big
issues, most members of the generation prefer to Involve themselves In
local causes like anti-drunk driving campaigns and neighborhood
crime watches.
According to Rolling Stone, the members of this generation
have also turned against the idea of enlisting in the military and fighting
for their country.
Asked to select situations under which they would enlist, 27
percent o f the men surveyed could not Identify any situation
that would lead them to enlist; 22 percent said they would
enlist if America's strategic Interests were threatened; 19
percent said they would enlist to keep a third-world nation
from falling to communists; 33 percent would enlist if our close
European allies were attacked; and 73 percent would enlist
If war broke out on the North American continent4.

Rolling Stone concludes that foreign-policy planners are just going to
have to live with this ‘ stunning political fa c t'. They argue that there is
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no longer a patriotic consensus supporting the cold war, and that
skepticism has replaced belief in the necessity of foreign entanglements.
Only 16 percent of the members of the generation think that the U.S.
should have fought the Vietnam War. 55 percent favor staying out of
other conflicts which might resemble Vietnam5. Top on this generation's
list of foreign policy objectives is slowing down the arms race, chosen
by 47 percent.
All of this might be heartening if the rest of the study didn't
present so many troubling contradictions. For example, when asked
why the U.S. had not won the Vietnam War the largest percentage of
respondents (36 percent) said that they "felt the United States failed to
make a great enough military effort.' And the second most important
foreign policy goal (next in line after arms reduction) is stopping
terrorism. "41 percent said they would mildly or strongly favor a
president who was committed to developing Star W ars.'6
Rolling Stone comments on the “split vision' of the generation,
remarking that
This generation favors the Idea o f redistributing Income to
produce more equality, but It Is opposed to tax Increases.... It
wants the government to stop terrorism and maintain a strong
defense, but it also wants the country to end global hunger
and stay out o f foreign conflicts. ... The future leader who
captures the Imagination of this generation will be the
candidate who breaks free of his or her party's standard
rhetoric and unashamedly embraces these contradictory
yearnings7.

The last sentence in that paragraph is particularly striking.
Standard rhetoric will no longer do. Contradictory yearnings should be
uncritically embraced. A rational stance is no longer necessary, even
as a pretense, asserts Rolling Stone. How have we come to this place?
An indication of where to look for an answer is provided by a
recent study on the Civil War by historian Eric Linderman8. I originally
approached Linderman'sstudy, Embattled Courage, with the intention
of comparing the contemporary process of developing a new improved
image of the Vietnam combat soldier to the similar process of revision
described by Underman. Linderman argues that the Civil War resulted
in the destruction of cherished soldierly ideals in both soldiers and
civilians on both sides. Soldiers, whose notions of honor and glory had
undergone radical change when they were subjected to the rigors of
the battlefield, resented their treatment by the civilians who had sent
them off to war. And civilians, heartilysick of war, wanted nothing more
to do with soldiers. This situation lasted some fifteen years until around
1880 when Americans once again became interested in hearing
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about the Civil War. Linderman argues that
As the Civil War was Incorporated in public ritual and the
reputation of soldiering rose, participation In war became an
Important mark o f merit. Honor attached itself less to
courageous or cowardly conduct, battles won or lost, causes
preserved or destroyed than to one's simple presence in the
w a r.... As community ritual magnified the war, the war began
to magnify all those who had fought and lived9.

This reassessment (which came some fifteen years after the
Civil War) seems mirrored in the revisionist histories of the Vietnam War
which began appearing in the early 1980s. The current reinterpretations
seem particularly ominous in light of Linderman's observation that:
"The values young men carried to war in 1898 were again those of
1861.... But the picture of war that sons carried to Cuba was false
because their fathers' memories had become false to the war of 1864
6 5 .'10
With this argument in mind, I began to document and describe
the phenomenon of the appearance of the Vietnam War in public
ritual and popular culture, and correlate that process with our growing
military presence in Central America. The argument seemed particularly
compelling in light of the recent headlines describing U.S. troop
movement in Honduras, and the first hints that we might consider using
military means to secure our access to the Panama Canal.
But the 7 April issue of Rolling Stone forced me to reevaluate
both my argument and my methodology. Pop culture rag that it is.
Rolling Stone had a point: as a generation, we docontradict ourselves.
Somehow, those contradictions must be dealt with. I don't buy the
Rolling Stone ideal of synthesis — the idea that one candidate, or party
or platform might really be able to reconcile all of those conflicting
desires. Many of those desires are mutually exclusive, and anyone who
looks at it rationally ought to be able to see that. But I do think they are
correct in identifying what it is that we want. And this raises new
questions: What is the process which causes clearly drawn ideological
lines to blur and fade over time? What are these clear ideologies
replaced by? How do new ideologies come into being?
The first possibility that comes to mind, of course, is a comparison
with Kuhn's” description of scientific paradigms — old paradigms do
not fall apart gradually, but are replaced only when a complete new
paradigm emerges and when the powerful proponents of the old
paradigm have died off. Kuhn's explanation, however, is not sufficient
for understanding the gradual process of paradigmatic metamorphosis
which seems to be occurring as this generation shifts piece-meal from
one ideological stance to another.
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Another problem with Kuhn isthat ideologies cannot be equated
with scientific paradigms; the purpose of an ideology is not to explain
a given set of phenomena, but to provide a social, cultural and
political framework with which a human being can assimilate and
interpret events. Ideologies 'renderotherwise incomprehensible social
situations meaningful,' they ’ construe them as to make it possible to
act purposefully within th e m '12. Exchanging one ideology for another
is almost always the result of some discomfort, some problem, with the
original ideology.
The decision to shift from one ideology to another is not made
at the level of group decision, however. Psychologist Daniel Goleman
provides us with a description of one of the important factors shaping
ideological shift in his book Vital Lies. Simple Truths: A Psychology o fSelf
Deception. Goleman attempts to tackle the difficult question of how
people choose their particular versions of reality in order to cope with
the anxieties of their day-to-day lives13. ’Technically speaking,' he
says, "c o p in g ' is the term for a range of cognitive maneuvers that
relieve stress arousal by changing one's own reaction rather than
altering the stressful situation itse lf.'14 He adds: ’ If the locus for anxiety
in the world is immovable, then that leaves room for change only in
how one perceives the w o rld .'15 Certain areas of thought, or events,
are blocked out or revised — seen in ’shadow'.
Though coping mechanisms occur on an individual level, they
have a cumulative social effect:
The collective mind Is as vulnerable to self-deceit as
the Individual mind. The particular zones of shadow for a
given collective are the product of a simple calculus o f the
schemas shared by Its members. The areas of experience
blanked out In the most Individual minds will be the darkest
zone for the group as a whole.
Cultures and nations offer the best examples o f this
principle writ large. ... An index of a culture's uniqueness, 1
suggest. Is Its blind spots, the particular elements of reality the
cultural 'we' represses to ease anxieties16.

If this is an accurate assessment, the examination of the popular
culture generated by a nation or a people takes on entirely new
meaning and significance. The nature of this shift might best be
explained by a use of the methaphor of the patient-therapist
relationship. The duty of the therapist is to be an objective listener, an
outsider, a mirror to the patient who is revealed to him or herself
gradually during the course of successful therapy. The therapist listens
carefully to what the patient says, and takes even more careful note
of what the patient does not say. As a patient's coping methods are
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gradually made conscious, the patient then has the opportunity to
discard mechanisms which were once successful but which may now
be self-destructive or damaging.
Popular culture reflects the unconscious decision of a society to
represent or repress particular events and conditions. A culture's
representations may provide the best map forthose who are interested
in studying its blind spots. Susan Kappeler, a feminist theorist who writes
chiefly about the implications of pornographic representation, has
thought deeply about the significance of representations as cultural
objects. In Pornography and Representation, she explains that:
Representations are not Just a matter of certain objects —
books. Images, films, etc. The structure of representation
extends to ‘perceptions' and self-images, the anxious pose of
the bourgeois community In front of the camera of public
opinion.... Representation Is thus one of the most fundamental
structures of conceptualization, centered on the subject. Just
as fiction Is not Just a matter of stories In books, but of narrative
conceptualization In general ... perception Is the
representation of something to oneself, a conflation of the
author and the audience In one single subject. Perception
externalized Inserts Itself Into the structure o f communication
between different subjects: author and audience may be
separate Individuals. It will therefore be expedient to look at
representation in the context o f communication17.

Popular culture mediums do not simply reflect the ideas and
opinions of the mass culture, but are part of an ongoing dialogue
between members of that culture, shaping and being shaped by their
individual anxieties and fears.
This process is described quite well by Jean Elshtain, who
asserts:
Narratlvesof warand polltlcsare Inseparable from theactMties
of war and politics; each — writing about and doing war and
politics — are practices existing In a complex, mutually
constitutive relationship. I espouse no vulgar notion of mimesis
here. Rather, stories of war and politics structure Individual
and collective experiences In ways that set the horizon for
human expectations In later epochs.... The politics of the text
distorts by expressing exaggerated fears and hopes —
amplifications that go on to become embedded In practices18.

And this brings me back to the Rolling Stone survey. If we take
their challenge seriously and try to create a coherent ideology out of
the generation's “contradictory yearnings' we are certainly doomed
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to failure. The challenge is, itself, a part of the problem — a gesture of
faith in illusion, a declaration of the need for a new coping mechanism.
We must, instead, question the ideological framework that supports
such a challenge.
The metaphor of the therapist seems, once again, peculiarly
suitable. A therapist notes his patient's delusions, but does not
participate in them, will not be drawn into the conversation on the
patient's terms. The mental health care worker who operates on the
level of societies rather than individuals might properly be called a
“cultural therapist." And it is as a cultural therapist that I will approach
the problems posed by Rolling Stone.
The cultural therapist, examining the survey results gathered
from questions about the Vietnam War, would formulate certain
important questions: 1) What are the bases on which this generation
has decided that the U.S. should not have been involved in the
Vietnam War? 2) What fears oranxieties are reflected in this generation's
reluctance to involve itself in foreign wars which it perceives to be
similar to the war in Vietnam? and, 3) In what terms are these issues
addressed?
The third question is the most crucial, and it is certainly the one
which would benefit most from the examination of a cultural therapist.
The terms of a discussion limit and define appropriate topics and
arguments. For example, the Rolling Stone survey asked which one of
four factors best explained why the U.S. lost the war in Vietnam:
36 percent said they felt the United States failed to make a
great enough military effort. Twenty percent cited the a ntl war
protests and the lack o f support In the United States for the
war. Another 20 percent felt It was because o f the lack of
adequate military and civilian support from our South
Vietnamese allies, and 8 percent said It was because o f the
strength and numbers o f the opposing communist forces'9.

What is the framework for the discussion here? Distinctly missing
are any factors which might be part of a moral or ethical discussion of
American involvement, or which might offer some kind of historical
perspective. The designers of the survey cannot be held entirely
responsible for their omission, which is reflected in the culture as a
whole and has been noted by other Vietnam War scholars. The
tendency to limit discussion of the Vietnam War by confining the arena
of discussion has been recognized by both traditional and popular
culture historians. The following two quotes illustrate this observation.
Historian William Gibson notes:
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(In the 1980s) The w a r... disappeared as a topic for study and
political consideration and Instead became dispersed and
Institutionalized in the complex o f medical, psychiatric, and
legal discourse. Itw asaslfanew serlesof medical and Judicial
problems with no traceable origin had appeared In American
society. Orrather.although It wasack nowledged that Vietnam
was the origin, once the word 'Vietnam' was mentioned, the
war itself was dismissed and discussion moved on to how an
Institution could solve the problem20.

In popular culture discourse, as well, the terms of the discussion
have been limited in the ways that Michael Clark describes:
The motive underlying Rambo: First Blood. Pa rt 2 and all the
other back-to-Nam films Is ... a desperate wish to restore the
community broken apart by that w a r... these films possess an
undercurrent of bitterness and Indignation at the betrayal of
Innocence that reflects the more profound and utopian
longing behind the poignant conclusion o f The Deerhunter.
the sappy optimism of The Lady from Yesterday, and the
sentimental re a liza tio n of personal correspondence
embodied In the most recent memorials. The utopian impulse
behind all of these works has come to dominate popular
representatlonsof the memory ofVletnam despite the lingering
political animosities stemming from that war. and the only
uncertainty that remains now seems to be whether that
Impulse will find expression In the xenophobic vengeance of
a chromed steel jungle knife, or the sentimental family Ideal
o f a letter home2’.

Both of these observations shed some light on the fears and
anxieties reflected in the answers to questions about Vietnam in the
Rolling Stone survey. By leaving out moral and historical questions and
focusing on the psychic damage the war has caused Americans, we,
as a society, can successfully avoid dealing with the difficult issue of
responsibility and leave our collective self-image intact. The extent to
which we are able to delude ourselves is stunning. In an August 1987
New York Times article about the city of Hu6, journalist Barbara
Crossette penned a line which promised absolution to any remaining
Americans who had moral qualms about the war: ’ Sometimes,' she
wrote, "the Vietnamese seemed to be blaming Americans less for
what happened here than Americans blame them selves.'22
On a societal as well as an individual psychological level, the
penalty for repression is repetition. In Goleman's word's: "On the one
hand, we forget we have done this before and, on the other, do not
quite realize what we are doing again. The self-deception is complete. ' a
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These words from J. Glenn G ray's classic World W ar 2 narrative.
The Warriors seem to most clearly represent the dangers of that process
of self-deception:
I am afraid to fo rg e t.... W hat protrudes and does not fit in our
pasts rises to haunt us and makes us spiritually unwell In the
present.... We may become refugees In an Inner sense unless
we remember to some purpose. Surely the menace of new
and more frightful wars Is not entirely unrelated to our failure
to understand those recently fought. If we could gain only a
modicum of greater wisdom concerning what manner of
men we are, what effect might it not have on future events?24
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